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Mobsters in the Monastery?
Applicability of Civil RICO to the
Clergy Sexual Misconduct Scandal
and the Catholic Church
And he [Christ] went into the temple, and began to cast out
them that sold therein, and them that bought; Saying unto
them, It is written, My house is a house of prayer; but ye have
made it a den of thieves.'
Reports of sexual misconduct by clergy members and subse-
quent allegations of cover-ups by bishops and other members of the
Roman Catholic Church hierarchy continue to grow at an alarming
rate. Almost every day, newspapers, television, and radio all re-
port new claims brought against priests, bishops, and dioceses by
plaintiffs who claim that they were sexually abused by priests and
other clergy members. Press coverage of many such lawsuits has
been very extensive,2 and "the damage from the scandals has been
financial as well as spiritual."3 As a result, liability has reached
"crisis proportions" in the Roman Catholic Church (Church).4 Al-
l. Luke 19:45, 46 (King James).
2. In response to media coverage, it is notable that the Vatican has identified
what it feels is an anti-Catholic bias in coverage of the clergy sexual-abuse crisis,
while contending that American news organizations are driven by "morbid and
scandalistic curiosity." Michael Paulson, Jesuit Journal Raps U.S. Media's Church
Coverage, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 31, 2002, at Al, available at 2002 WL 4130238.
3. Sex Abuse Costs Have Church Reeling: Dioceses Have Sold Land, Build-
ings to Settle Cases, SUBURBAN Cm. NEws, Mar. 15, 2002, available at http:l/
www.suburbanchicagonews.com/heraldnews/focus/churchabuse/031502costs.htm
[hereinafter Costs Have Church Reeling].
4. James T. O'Reilly & Joann M. Strasser, Clergy Sexual Misconduct: Con-
fronting the Difficult Constitutional and Institutional Liability Issues, 7 ST.
THoMAs L. REV. 31, 32 (1994). The Archdiocese of Boston has already spent ap-
proximately fifty million dollars in lawsuit settlements over the last ten years,
with more than 450 cases presently pending. Pete Waldmeir, Cardinal Law Be-
trayed Vows and Trust at High Cost, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 15, 2002, at B1, available
at 2002 WL 102338869. Some commentators have suggested that bankruptcy may
be the next step for the diocese. Larry Whitham, Boston's Cardinal Law Expected
to Offer Resignation, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2002, at A3, available at 2002 WL
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though the nationwide financial toll is unknown since most settle-
ments are confidential, estimates of payments to victims range
from three hundred million dollars to one billion dollars.5 Most al-
legations are based on direct sexual abuse by clergy members and
subsequent failure on the part of Church authority to take ade-
quate and responsible steps following notification of such acts.
Claims against bishops and archbishops allege that pedophile 6
priests, following some preliminary treatment or penance, are "as-
signed to another parish, usually at a calculated distance from
[their] last assignment[s] ."7 Thus, two main themes run through
almost every allegation: 1) failure on the part of Church hierarchy
to "react vigorously when clergy are accused of sexual misconduct;"
and 2) violations of the "religious leader's position of trust and
abuse of the spiritual leader's power over the victim."8
Lawsuits against predator priests and the Church have tradi-
tionally been rooted in tort principles. In an attempt to reach the
deep-pockets of the Church, plaintiffs have frequently attached re-
spondeat superior 9 claims to those made against the individual
priest, 10 some of which include negligent hiring and supervision,'"
and even sexual harassment. 12 Although these strategies have
generally yielded favorable results for many plaintiffs of clergy
sexual abuse, lawyers have been continually seeking new methods
2923342. Declaring bankruptcy would protect the diocese from further abuse and
negligence claims, but would subject the internal affairs of the Church to the in-
vestigative efforts of the legal system. Id. Additionally, the Vatican must approve
a bankruptcy filing. Id.
5. Costs Have Church Reeling, supra note 3.
6. Pedophilia is defined as "[sexual perversion] in which children are the pre-
ferred sexual object." WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1665 (1986). While
ephebophilia, defined as "[homosexual attraction] to young men," id. at 761, may
also be at issue in many clergy abuse cases, this Comment will use "pedophilia" to
encompass all types of related sexual misconduct.
7. John J. Dreese, The Other Victims of Priest Pedophilia, COMMONWEAL,
Apr. 22, 1994, at 11, available at 1994 WL 13177756.
8. O'Reilly & Strasser, supra note 4, at 36-37.
9. Respondeat superior is the "doctrine [that] stands for the proposition that
when an employer.., is acting through the facility of an employee or agent... and
tort liability is incurred during the course of this agency due to some fault of the
agent, then the employer .. . must accept the responsibility." STEVEN H. GIFiS,
BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 437 (4th ed. 1996).
10. O'Reilly & Strasser, supra note 4, at 39.
11. See, e.g., Jones v. Trane, 591 N.Y.S.2d 927 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993); Moses v.
Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1137 (1994).
12. See Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
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and theories through which to attack pedophile priests, their bish-
ops and archbishops, and the institutional church bodies they re-
present and oversee. The latest theory for recovery is the
application of the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Orga-
nizations Act of 1970 (RICO),' 3 best known for its use against or-
ganized crime. 14 Although no case has yet gone to trial, claims
have been filed in Florida,15 Minnesota, 16 and California, 17 each
based on the theory that the Catholic Church hierarchy is involved
in "a conspiracy of silence to protect priests who abuse children"' 8
by failing to keep predator priests away from children, failing to
report abuse to authorities, and paying money to victims in order
to keep the misconduct secret. 19
Enacted as part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970
(OCCA)20 that sought the "eradication of organized crime in the
United States,"21 RICO is traditionally associated with and was
originally used as a tool to prosecute the mafia and similar under-
world criminal enterprises. In general, a RICO violation results
"from the use of power, acquired by crime, to gain or maintain a
foothold in an enterprise that operates in interstate commerce."22
13. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000).
14. RICO Suit Filed in Bishop's Sex Abuse Case, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2002
available at http://www.washtimes.com/upi-breaking22032002-113039-7966r.
htm.
15. Id. A team of Minnesota lawyers has filed RICO suits in both Florida and
Minnesota against former Roman Catholic Bishop Anthony J. O'Connell. The
Florida suit also names as defendants the dioceses of Jefferson City, Missouri;
Knoxville, Tennessee; and Palm Beach, Florida. See Priests as Racketeers?, at
About.com, http://1aw.about.com/library/weekly/aa042202a.htm (last visited Mar.
15, 2003) (on file with author) for a summary of the allegations against O'Connell.
16. Id.
17. Glenn F. Bunting & Richard Winton, Ex-Altar Boy Alleges Priest Abused
Him. Litigation: Complaint Filed Under Federal Racketeering Law Claims Maho-
ney Protected Father Baker. Cardinal Calls the Suit Baseless. L.A. TIMES, May 21,
2002, at B1, available at 2002 WL 2477196.
18. Agence France-Presse, Anti-mobster 'RICO' Law Used vs. Roman Catholic
Church, Mar. 23, 2002, at INQ7.net, http://www.inq7.net/wnw/2002/mar/24/-
wnw_6-1.htm (on file with author).
19. Bunting & Winton, supra note 17, at 1.
20. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922
(codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
21. GREGORY P. JOSEPH, CIVIL RICO: A DEFINITIVE GUIDE 3 (2d ed. 2000).
22. Mark Stephen Poker, Reaching a Deep-Pocket Under the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 72 MARQ. L. REV. 511, 513 (1989) (citing
Andrew P. Bridges, Private RICO Litigation Based Upon "Fraud in the Sale of
Securties," 18 GA. L. REV. 43, 48 (1983)).
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To better achieve its goal, RICO provides both criminal and civil
remedies to eliminate organized crime and justly compensate those
injured by the criminal acts. 23 The inclusion of a treble damages
provision for RICO violations has transformed the law into an at-
tractive basis for recovery in suits that Congress by no means envi-
sioned when formulating the statute.24 Specifically, section
1964(c) of the act provides that "any person injured in his business
or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 ... may sue
therefore in any appropriate United States District Court and
shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the
suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 25 In recent years, the
inherent ambiguity of the statute itself, coupled with a broad read-
ing by the Supreme Court, has led to RICO's application in areas
well beyond its original and intended focus, including use of the
statute against both tobacco companies 26 and pro-life abortion
clinic protestors. 27
Motivated by the treble damages provision and armed with
precedent extending RICO's application to non-mafia entities, law-
yers for victims of clergy sexual abuse are now attempting to apply
the statute's prohibitions to pedophile priests and Church hierar-
chy.28 This Comment will consider the viability of RICO-based
claims against priests, high-ranking Church officials, and the
Catholic Church itself, addressing the likely defenses and constitu-
tional issues that may arise if a court is to entertain a RICO-based
claim. 29 Following an examination of legislative history and case
law, this analysis will illustrate that application of RICO to clergy
sexual abuse cases is inappropriate, regardless of the statute's lib-
eral interpretation in recent years.
23. Anne Melley, The Stretching of Civil RICO: Pro-life Demonstrators Are
Racketeers?, 56 UMKC L. Rev. 287, 289 (1988).
24. Id.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 314 F.3d 612 (D.C. Cir.
2003); Attorney Gen. of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, 268 F.3d 103
(2d Cir. 2001).
27. See Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 624 F. Supp. 736 (E.D.
Pa. 1985), vacated and remanded, 813 F.2d 53 (3d Cir. 1987), on remand, 665 F.
Supp. 1147 (E.D. Pa. 1987), 670 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
28. RICO Suit Filed in Bishop's Sex Abuse Case, supra note 14.
29. Although clergy sexual abuse plagues many religious denominations, this
Comment will address the problem in the context of the Roman Catholic Church.
The two main reasons for this focus are the controversial and high-profile nature of
the issue and the distinct hierarchal structure of the Roman Catholic Church.
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Specifically, this Comment begins with an assessment of
RICO's legislative history and purpose. After establishing this
foundation, Part II will illustrate the significant liberal extensions
of RICO in recent years in three particularly important cases. Part
III will then specifically address the applicability of section 1962(b)
to bishops, archbishops, and upper-level Church authorities, while
Part IV will address the applicability of section 1962(c) to both in-
dividual pedophile priests and Church authorities. A discussion of
the potential statute of limitations issues presented in this context
will follow in section V, while Parts VI and VII will address vicari-
ous liability and constitutional defenses, respectively. Finally, this
Comment will conclude that application of RICO has extended far
beyond its original focus and should be constrained by legislative
action and amendment.
I. RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONs ACT
A. General Text and Sections
Section 1962 of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
zations Act is split into four distinct subsections.30 In general
terms, section 1962(a) prohibits the use of income derived from a
pattern of racketeering activity to acquire an interest in an enter-
prise;31 section 1962(b) prohibits the acquisition or maintenance of
an interest in or control of an enterprise through a pattern of rack-
30. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d) (2000).
31. Section 1962(a) declares that:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received income derived, di-
rectly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through the
collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a
principle within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to
use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, in acquisition
of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise
which is engaged in, or the activities which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of
investment, and without the intention of controlling or participating in
the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be un-
lawful under this subsection if the securities of the issuer held by the pur-
chaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices
in any pattern or racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful
debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of
the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in
law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2000).
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eteering activity;3 2 section 1962(c) prohibits the conducting of the
affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity;33 and section 1962(d) prohibits conspiracy to violate any of the
three preceding subsections.34 The act provides for civil remedies
in section 1964(c).35
B. Legislative History and Purpose
Following the Senate Committee determination that "organ-
ized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversi-
fied, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of
dollars from America's economy,"36 Congress enacted RICO as part
of the OCCA. However, what Congress meant by the term "organ-
ized crime" is still unclear decades later. Despite section 904(a)'s
express provision that Title IX of the OCCA be "liberally construed
to effectuate its remedial purpose,"37 the congressional records
support the proposition that RICO was designed to apply only to
certain and distinct criminal entities.
There is evidence in the congressional record indicating that
RICO's intended application was to traditional organized crime
and underworld families. Senator John L. McClellan's detailed ac-
count of the business practices of the "mob" supports this
proposition:
The infiltration of legitimate businesses by organized crime
has been increasingly documented in the past year. Once it
32. Section 1962(b) declares that: "It shall be unlawful for any person through
a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to ac-
quire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise
which is engaged in, or the activities which affect, interstate or foreign commerce."
18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (2000).
33. Section 1962(c) declares that:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or for-
eign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the con-
duct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity
or collection of an unlawful debt.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2000).
34. Section 1962(d) declares that: "It shall be unlawful for any person to con-
spire to violate any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section." 18
U.S.C. § 1962(d) (2000).
35. See supra text accompanying notes 23-25.
36. 115 CONG. REC. S1861, 9569 (1969).
37. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, ch. 96, § 904(a), 84
Stat. 947 (1970).
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invades a legitimate field of endeavor, the mob quickly brings
with it a full range of corrupt practices. It sometimes uses
terror tactics to obtain a larger share of the market. Labor
unions are infiltrated, and then labor peace is sold to busi-
nesses ... [i]n business, the mob bleeds a firm of assets, then
takes bankruptcy. It steals securities and then uses the sto-
len securities to fraudulently obtain funds from lending insti-
tutions . . [t]hrough the violence used in its operations and
its rigidly enforced code of silence, as well as exploitation of
non members in its schemes, the mob seeks to gain immunity
from the rules of our society .... 38
The Senator's detailed explanation of the practices of the "mob"
supports the argument that RICO was intended only for those par-
ticular types of organized criminals, and not for "non-mob" organ-
ized groups. His explicit focus on the "mob's" methods of business
infiltration strongly supports the proposition that the statute be
applicable only to entities that function in such specified manners.
In addition to the above assertions, Senator McClellan's use of
the terms mafia and "La Cosa Nostra" elsewhere in the congres-
sional record supports the presumption that RICO was intended to
be used as a tool against only these certain types of organizations:
The most influential of these [organized crime] groups, the 26
families of La Cosa Nostra, estimated to have a total mem-
bership of some 3,000 to 5,000, operate, however, primarily in
New York, New Jersey, Illinois, Florida, Louisiana, Michigan,
Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. The internal organization
of these families is patterned after the ancient Mafia groups
of Sicily. 39
McClellan's obvious reference to "La Cosa Nostra" as the most in-
fluential of organized crime groups strongly supports the assertion
that RICO's intended target be only "La Cosa Nostra" itself and
other similarly functioning "families."
In addition to language contained in the congressional records,
the general inability of authorities to control the mafia in the years
prior to the passage of the OCCA also supports the law's narrow
38. 116 CONG. REC. S30, 18,939 (daily ed. Jun. 9, 1970) (statement of Sen.
McClellan).
39. 116 CONG. REC. S30, 18,913 (daily ed. Jun. 9, 1970) (statement of Sen.
McClellan).
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enforcement to such intended parties.40 This difficulty in prosecu-
tion of mafia figures motivated the government to provide a "new
arsenal for [flederal officials in their war against organized
crime."4 1
Although both the timing of the bill's passage and the legisla-
tive history of the OCCA strongly suggest applicability only to
traditional organized crime and mafia entities, RICO has recently
been utilized in cases well beyond this original purpose. An under-
standing of these cases is helpful prior to an examination of RICO's
potential applicability in the context of clergy sexual misconduct.
II. LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF RICO THROUGH CASE LAW
Since its inception in 1970, courts have broadly interpreted
RICO to include defendants who do not fit into any of the afore-
mentioned concepts of "organized crime." In support of such inter-
pretation is section 904(a) of the OCCA, which expressly provides
that "[tihe provisions of [RICO] shall be liberally construed to ef-
fectuate its remedial purposes."42 The recent application of RICO
in the following three cases highlights this liberal approach and
helps illustrate the current status of civil RICO.
A. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex,43 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit was faced with two issues concerning
the use of civil RICO in a business fraud action.44 The first issue
was whether a criminal conviction on the underlying predicate of-
fenses is a prerequisite to commencing a private civil action. 45 The
second issue was whether, as a standing requirement in a civil
RICO action, the plaintiff must allege and prove a "competitive" or
40. In the years following World War II, involvement of the FBI in organized
crime investigations was hampered by the lack of possible federal laws covering
crimes perpetrated by racketeers. Because many "mob" activities were carried out
locally or otherwise did not fall within the Bureau's jurisdiction, RICO was enacted
to counter this problem. Post-War America (1945-1960s), at FBI homepage, http://
www.fbi.gov/ibref/historic/history/postwar.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
41. 116 CONG. REC. 844 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1970) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
42. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, ch. 96, § 904(a), 84
Stat. 947 (1970).
43. 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
44. Melley, supra note 23, at 292.
45. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 496.
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"racketeering injury," defined as an injury additional to those re-
sulting from predicate acts of racketeering.46 After the Second Cir-
cuit answered both questions in the affirmative, creating two
"artificial limitations on the availability of civil RICO,"47 the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari. 48
Following an examination of RICO's history and purpose, the
Court found "no support in the statute's history, its language, or
considerations of policy for a requirement that a private treble
damages action under [section] 1964(c) can proceed only against a
defendant who has already been criminally convicted."49 In addi-
tion, the Court held that the Second Circuit's standing require-
ment, that plaintiff must allege an injury that RICO was designed
to deter, was "unhelpfully tautological. ''50 The Court rejected the
need for an "additional, amorphous 'racketeering injury' require-
ment,"51 finding it inaccurate in light of the specifically enumer-
ated predicate acts that represented the kind of conduct that
Congress sought to deter. 52 Accordingly, by "[d]eferring to the leg-
islative mandate that RICO be read broadly to effectuate its reme-
dial purposes," 53 the Court reversed the Second Circuit and
rendered a decision that effectively sanctioned liberal application
of RICO far beyond the mobster context. The Court flatly rejected
the generally understood requirement of a nexus to organized
crime in order to state a claim under civil RICO,54 making the
cause of action potentially available given any violation of a predi-
cate act.
While settling the legal issues presented in the case, Sedima
opened the door for an "entirely new wave of problems, the most
serious being the potential abuse of civil RICO's generous remedies
by overzealous or overreaching practitioners.155 The abortion
46. Id. at 494-95.
47. Id. at 487.
48. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, 469 U.S. 1157 (1985).
49. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, 473 U.S. 479, 492 (1985).
50. Id. at 494.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Melley, supra note 23, at 294.
54. See id. at 292 ("The pre-Sedima years in the history of civil RICO are
marked by the unwillingness of certain courts to allow civil RICO to be used in
cases involving persons other than the stereotypical 'mobster' or member of an or-
ganized crime family.").
55. Id.
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clinic and protest cases that soon followed help illustrate the im-
pact of Sedima's precedent.
B. Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle56
Following the Court's decision in Sedima, the Northeast Wo-
men's Center, a women's health center in Philadelphia that pro-
vides abortion and other services, "launched an unprecedented
attempt" to institute a private civil RICO action against anti-abor-
tion protesters following "sit-ins" that occurred at the clinic be-
tween 1984 and 1986.57 The complaint alleged a conspiracy among
the pro-life protestors to harass and terrorize plaintiffs clients and
employees, unlawful entry onto the plaintiffs property, destruction
of its equipment, admission to the clinic through fraudulent repre-
sentations, libel and defamation of plaintiffs employees and cli-
ents, and distribution of false and misleading information to
plaintiffs clients.58  Based on these acts, the complaint alleged
that the defendants were "engaged in an ongoing criminal enter-
prise and pattern of racketeering activity . . . in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1962," 59 and that the protestors had formed various orga-
nizations that, through a pattern of racketeering activity, dis-
rupted, harassed, and otherwise harmed the clinic's "business and
property with the goal of destroying both."60
56. 689 F. Supp. 465 (E.D. Pa. 1988), affd, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989).
57. Melley, supra note 23, at 296-97.
58. Id. at 298 (citing plaintiffs amended complaint).
59. Id. (citing plaintiffs amended complaint).
60. Id. at 299 (citing plaintiffs amended complaint). The plaintiffs alleged
robbery and violations of the Hobbs Act as the predicate acts of their RICO claims.
Id. RICO suits often allege violations of the Hobbs Act as racketeering activities
under section 1961(1). The Hobbs Act prohibits the obstruction of commerce or the
movement of any article therein through robbery or extortion and provides for
fines of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than twenty years, or
both. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2000). Section 1961(1) thus incorporates violations of the
Hobbs Act as predicate acts for RICO purposes, requiring an examination of rele-
vant Hobbs Act case law and history to determine whether a racketeering activity
exists for the RICO claim asserted. See Alexander M. Parker, Note, Stretching
RICO to the Limit and Beyond, 45 DUKE L.J. 819 (1996) (arguing that the Hobbs
Act's broad definition of extortion has allowed the statute, through RICO, to be-
come a vehicle used to punish picketing and political protest).
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In response, McMonagle argued that the clinic's attempted use
of RICO was far from the purpose of the statute.6 1 Despite point-
ing out that the clear purpose of RICO was to eradicate organized
crime in the United States, the court sustained the clinic's claim,
adding that it was fully aware that RICO had become a method for
redressing virtually all means of misconduct rather than a
"weapon for derailing the activities of 'the archetypal, intimidating
mobster."' 6 2 After four days of deliberation, the jury returned a
verdict in favor of the clinic, finding that twenty-two of the protes-
tors had violated section 1964(c), and that five others had violated
section 1964(d). 63 Despite a strong First Amendment argument by
the defense, 64 the district court sustained the jury verdict. 65
The importance of McMonagle is that it represented a com-
plete departure from the traditional notions associated with appli-
cation of RICO, confirming the potential for the statute's use
against parties that have no connection whatsoever to organized
crime families. Following McMonagle, civil RICO now stands as a
"dangerous vehicle [that] business, government, and other organi-
zations can use [as a threat against] those wishing to stage demon-
strations at their facilities."6 6 Today, McMonagle represents the
extent to which civil RICO has departed from its original intended
purpose to fight organized crime, and serves as valuable precedent
for plaintiffs attempting to bring RICO claims against priests,
bishops, dioceses, and other Church institutions.
61. The plaintiffs in McMonagle alleged that the purpose of the statute was to
put an end to "the infiltration of legitimate businesses and labor unions by organ-
ized crime and to curtail the resultant interference with free competition and com-
merce." Melley, supra note 23, at 300 (citing Memo. of Law in Supp. of Def.
Omnibus Mot. to Dismiss at 3-4, Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 624
F. Supp. 736 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (citing United States v. Forsythe, 429 F. Supp. 715
(W.D. Pa. 1977))).
62. Id. at 305 (citing Bench Op. on Def.'s Mots. for Directed Verdicts at 10,
McMonagle (May 8, 1987) (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, 473 U.S. 479, 499
(1985))).
63. Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 689 F. Supp. 465, 467 (E.D.
Pa. 1988), affd, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989); see
also Melley, supra note 23, at 308.
64. See Parker, supra note 60, at 843-44.
65. McMonagle, 689 F. Supp. at 477. The jury's verdict was upheld as to all
but one defendant where the district court held that there was insufficient evi-
dence to convict her of conspiracy under section 1962(d), thus granting her motion
for judgement not withstanding the verdict. Id. at 475-77.
66. Melley, supra note 23, at 309.
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C. National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler
Subsequent to Sedima and McMonagle, the Supreme Court
made a significant extension in RICO jurisprudence with National
Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler.67 In Scheidler, the Na-
tional Organization for Women, Inc. and two women's health care
centers brought suit in the Northern District of Illinois against
several anti-abortion activist organizations. 68 The plaintiffs al-
leged that the defendant organizations had conspired to destroy
the business of the health care providers through a pattern of ille-
gal activities in violation of RICO. 69 The district court dismissed
the claim, "finding that absent an allegation that the racketeering
enterprise or predicate acts have some profit-generating purpose,
plaintiffs did not have a valid claim under RICO."70
After the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed the decision below, 71 the Supreme Court reversed,
holding that RICO does not require plaintiffs to show that a racke-
teering enterprise or the predicate acts of racketeering have a
profit-generating purpose.72 The Court noted that neither the defi-
nition of the term "enterprise" nor the language in section 1962(c)
suggests any indication that RICO requires an economic motive, 73
adding that section 1962(c) prohibits racketeering activities per-
formed by enterprises whose activities simply "affect" interstate
and/or foreign commerce. 74 By removing any implicit requirement
of an economic motive to state a valid RICO claim, the Court con-
cluded that an "enterprise" under section 1962(c) need only be an
association in fact that engaged in a pattern of racketeering
activity. 75
The significance of Scheidler lies in its removal of the final ves-
tiges of the common associations and motives related to RICO
67. 510 U.S. 249 (1994).
68. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. 937, 938 (N.D. Ill.
1991).
69. See id.
70. Amy L. Mauk, Comment, RICO-Abortion Protestors Subject to Civil RICO
Actions-National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 28 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 288, 289 (1994) (citing Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. at 939-45).
71. National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612, 614 (7th Cir.
1992).
72. Scheidler, 510 U.S. at 262.
73. Id. at 256-60.
74. Id. at 258.
75. Id. at 259.
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claims. Rather than a tool to be used against organized crime enti-
ties seeking profit and economic gain, Scheidler sanctioned RICO's
use in a multitude of situations wholly unrelated to organized
crime. Because Scheidler no longer limits RICO to profit-seeking
enterprises or financially motivated predicate acts, it significantly
widens the class of defendants potentially liable under the statute.
The trend illustrated by Sedima, McMonagle, and Scheidler
shows that RICO has become an attractive tool for various types of
plaintiffs. By moving away from a traditional nexus with organ-
ized crime, courts have provided plaintiffs with another option in
formulating their claims against potential defendants. This trend
has made RICO the newest option for lawyers of the victims of
clergy-related sexual abuse. In the context of RICO's expanded ap-
plicability, courts may soon have to determine whether such plain-
tiffs can state a claim under RICO.
III. APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 1962(B) TO BISHOPS,
ARCHBISHOPS, AND OTHER HIGH-LEVEL
CHURCH AUTHORITIES
7 6
To state a valid claim under section 1962(b), clergy-related
sexual abuse victims will need to prove each of several distinct ele-
ments as defined by both the statute itself and by subsequent case
law.77 Under section 1962(b), plaintiff must allege and prove that:
A) a person,
B) acting with the necessary mens rea,
C) through a pattern of
D) racketeering activity or collection of an unlawful debt,
E) acquired or maintained any interest in or control of,
F) an enterprise engaged in or affecting commerce,
G) resulting in injury to the plaintiffs business or property
76. This Comment will explain the applicability of section 1962(b) to upper-
level Church authorities and the applicability of section 1962(c) to both individual
priests and upper-level Church authorities. Because most courts have understood
section 1962(a) to reach only those "injuries proximately resulting from
defendant's investment of racketeering income," this Comment will not focus on its
applicability in this context. See EDwARD F. MANNINO, THE CIVIL RICO PRIMER 3:1
(1996). Additionally, this Comment will not focus on section 1962(d) because
conspiracy to violate sections 1962(b) and (c) would require satisfaction of the
elements specified for each. Because this Comment concludes that victims of
clergy related sexual abuse can not bring valid claims under either section 1962(b)
or (c), inquiry into section 1962(d) is unnecessary.
77. JOSEPH, supra note 21, at 124.
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H) by reason of the defendant's acquisition or maintenance of
the interest in, or control over, the enterprise. 7
8
A. Person
Victims of clergy-related sexual abuse will be able to establish
that upper-level Church officials, including bishops and archbish-
ops, each qualify as "persons" for section 1962(b) purposes. RICO
defines "person" to include any "individual or entity capable of
holding a legal or beneficial interest in property."79 This statutory
definition of "person" applies to both plaintiffs bringing an action
under section 1964(c) and defendants whose action is proscribed by
section 1962(a), (b), (c), or (d).80 In view of the broad definition of
"person" provided in the statute, victims of clergy sexual abuse
would have little difficulty satisfying this first requirement in their
RICO claims.
B. Acting with the Necessary Mens Rea
In order to prove liability under RICO, plaintiffs must gener-
ally prove that a defendant acted with the appropriate mens rea,8s
possessing the specific intent associated with each underlying
predicate offense.8 2 In some circuits, the defendant must act with
"the specific intent to participate in the overall RICO enterprise,"8 3
although this is not the majority rule. Mens rea may be shown
both directly, as by admission,8 4 and circumstantially, as by the
existence of a scheme reasonably calculated to deceive persons of
ordinary comprehension and prudence when the intention is
shown by examination of the scheme itself.8 5
Assuming likely allegations of obstruction of justice, mail and
wire fraud, and bribery as predicate acts,8 6 plaintiffs must prove
the underlying intent for each act separately. Theoretically, plain-
78. Id. at 125.
79. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (2000).
80. JOSEPH, supra note 21, at 65.
81. Id. at 121.
82. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. Court of Delaware, 279 F.3d
219 (3d Cir. 2002); Genty v. Resolution Trust Co., 937 F.2d 899 (3d Cir. 1991);
Schimpf v. Gerald, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (E.D. Wis. 1998).
83. See, e.g., Zolfaghari v. Sheikholeslami, 943 F.2d 451 (4th Cir. 1991).
84. JOSEPH, supra note 21, at 122.
85. Ikuno v. Yip, 912 F.2d 306, 310-11 (9th Cir. 1990).
86. See discussion infra Part III.D.
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tiffs could prove the mens rea for obstruction of justice with evi-
dence that the defendant knowingly refrained from reporting
allegations of sexual abuse to authorities. For their mail and wire
fraud claims, plaintiffs could prove the necessary mens rea with
evidence that the defendant transferred predator priests with ade-
quate knowledge that they would abuse again and with the intent
to deceive parishioners. The admissions of Church authorities,
such as former Cardinal Bernard Law of Boston, disclosing the se-
cretive transfers of priests like John Geoghan and other varying
attempts to keep word of clergy sexual abuse away from law en-
forcement authorities would be indicative of the intent necessary
for each predicate act.8 7 Additionally, plaintiffs could prove the
necessary mens rea for their bribery allegations through represen-
tations made to plaintiffs by Church authorities or actual payment
to plaintiffs in exchange for forbearance of their claims against the
priests, in addition to calling attention to large bank accounts
maintained by the Church for the sole purpose of making such
payments 8
87. Allegations of appalling conduct in the Archdiocese of Boston continue to
become public, most implicating Cardinal Law "in a decades-long pattern of cover-
ing up sexual abuse by clerics, secretly settling lawsuits and quietly moving priests
to new assignments, where they often molested other children." Cardinal Law
Must Go, HARTFORD COuRANT, Dec. 13, 2002, at A16, available at LEXIS, News
Group File, All. Although Law has continually apologized for his actions, claiming
that he did not know the extent of the abuse, new documents show that he was
repeatedly informed of misconduct and only "coddled" abusive priests to minimize
their evil acts. Id. After months of speculation, Pope John Paul II accepted Law's
resignation on Dec. 13, 2002, making Law the highest-ranking Church official
"felled" by the Church's sexual abuse scandal. Franci Richardson & Tom
Mashberg, Law Resigns, BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 14, 2002, at 2, available at 2002
WL 4094957. Additionally, at least four bishops have resigned after being accused
of sexual misconduct, while the Office of the Attorney General has recently subpoe-
naed Bishop Thomas Daily of Brooklyn, New York; Bishop John McCormack of
Manchester, New Hampshire; Archbishop Alfred Hughes of New Orleans, Louisi-
ana; Bishop William Murphy of Rockville Centre, New York; and Bishop Robert
Banks of Green Bay, Wisconsin to appear before a grand jury looking into similar
potential criminal violations. Id.; Larry Whitham, Boston's Cardinal Law Expected
to Offer Resignation; Meets with Pope Today to Discuss Sex-abuse Scandal, Bank-
ruptcy, WASH. TIMEs, Dec. 13, 2002, at A3, available at LEXIS, News Group File,
All.
88. Lawyers bringing RICO suits against the Church argue that RICO is war-
ranted "because the church has engaged in a pattern of concealing criminal con-
duct to protect the priests and the church 'and maintaining bank accounts for the
purpose of quietly paying off victims/complainants.'" Rita Ciolli, Law Firm Moves
Against Diocese: Files Suit Alleging Secret Settlement in Abuse Claims, NEWSDAY,
June 7, 2002, at A27, available at 2002 WL 2747383.
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C. Through a Pattern of Racketeering Activity
Section 1961(5) defines "pattern of racketeering" to require "at
least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after
the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred
within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the
commission of a prior act of racketeering activity."8 9 However, fol-
lowing the Sedima Court's implication that two isolated acts of
racketeering activity alone do not constitute a pattern90 and that
there must be a "continuity plus relationship"91 among the predi-
cate acts, the meaning of a RICO "pattern" remains blurred.
The Supreme Court attempted to clarify the ambiguity by
adopting and partially defining the "continuity plus relationship"
approach in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.9 2 To de-
fine the "relationship" requirement, the Court looked to Title X of
the OCCA, the Dangerous Special Offender Sentencing Act,
93
which contains a pattern requirement based solely on the relation-
ship of a defendant's criminal acts to one another: "[Ciriminal con-
duct forms a pattern if it embraces criminal acts that have the
same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or meth-
ods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing
characteristics and are not isolated events."94 The Court found no
reason to suppose that Congress intended any other meaning for
the relatedness of predicate acts under RICO. 95
As for continuity, the Court adopted "both a closed and open-
ended concept" of analysis.96 Closed-ended continuity may be es-
tablished with "proof of a series of related predicates extended over
a substantial period of time,"9 7 while open-ended continuity re-
quires proof of "a threat of continued racketeering activity."98
Most courts consider that the determination of what constitutes a
"'substantial' duration" for the purposes of closed-ended continuity
89. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (2000).
90. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985).
91. Id,
92. 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
93. 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1970) (partially repealed 1986).
94. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1970).
95. H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 240 (1985).
96. Id. at 241.
97. Id. at 242.
98. Id.
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is a matter for case-by-case determination.99 However, courts ana-
lyzing open-ended continuity usually look for a threat of repetition
through the character of the predicate acts, a showing that the acts
are part of an ongoing entity's way of doing business, and whether
the predicate acts can be attributed to a defendant's "operating as
part of a long-term association that exists for criminal
purposes."10 0
Assuming that a court entertains their purported claims of
racketeering activity, victims bringing a section 1962(b) claim
against bishops, archbishops, and other Church authorities would
also have little difficulty showing the presence of a pattern.
Whether they allege at least two acts constituting obstruction of
justice, bribery, mail fraud, or wire fraud, the predicate acts would
likely be "related" in purpose and method of commission. Plaintiffs
could also fulfill the "continuity" requirement by showing a period
of repeated action along with the threat of repetition through the
character of the individual crimes, the size of the bank accounts
kept for bribery purposes, and evidence showing that the Church
handled other sexual abuse scandals similarly.
D. Racketeering Activity
Section 1961(1) sets forth an all-inclusive list of conduct that
can constitute predicate acts of racketeering under RICO,10 1 thus,
99. Walk v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 890 F.2d 688, 690 (4th Cir. 1989).
100. H.J., 492 U.S. at 242-43.
101. According to 18 U.S.C. §1961(1), "racketeering activity" is defined as:
(A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, rob-
bery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in a con-
trolled substance or listed chemical (as defined in section 102 of the
Controlled Substances Act), which is chargeable under State law and pun-
ishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which is in-
dictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, United States
Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports brib-
ery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659
(relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under sec-
tion 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement from pension
and welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relating to extortionate credit trans-
actions), section 1028 (relating to fraud and related activity in connection
with identification documents), section 1029 (relating to fraud and related
activity in connection with access devices), section 1084 (relating to the
transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail
fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section 1344 (relating to fi-
nancial institution fraud), section 1425 (relating to the procurement of cit-
izenship or nationalization unlawfully), section 1426 (relating to the
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reproduction of naturalization or citizenship papers), section 1427 (relat-
ing to the sale of naturalization or citizenship papers), sections 1461-1465
(relating to obscene matter), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of jus-
tice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), sec-
tion 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement),
section 1512 (relating to tampering with a witness, victim, or an inform-
ant), section 1513 (relating to retaliating against a witness, victim, or an
informant), section 1542 (relating to false statement in application and
use of passport), section 1543 (relating to forgery or false use of passport),
section 1544 (relating to misuse of passport), section 1546 (relating to
fraud and misuse of visas, permits, and other documents), sections 1581-
1588 (relating to peonage and slavery), section 1951 (relating to interfer-
ence with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to rack-
eteering), section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering
paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund pay-
ments), section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling busi-
nesses), section 1956 (relating to the laundering of monetary
instruments), section 1957 (relating to engaging in monetary transactions
in property derived from specified unlawful activity), section 1958 (relat-
ing to use of interstate commerce facilities in the commission of murder-
for-hire), sections 2251, 2251A, 2252, and 2260 (relating to sexual ex-
ploitation of children), sections 2312 and 2313 (relating to interstate
transportation of stolen motor vehicles), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating
to interstate transportation of stolen property), section 2318 (relating to
trafficking in counterfeit labels for phonorecords, computer programs or
computer program documentation or packaging and copies of motion pic-
tures or other audiovisual works), section 2319 (relating to criminal in-
fringement of a copyright), section 2319A (relating to unauthorized
fixation of and trafficking in sound recordings and music videos of live
musical performances), section 2320 (relating to trafficking in goods or
services bearing counterfeit marks), section 2321 (relating to trafficking
in certain motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts), sections 2341-2346 (re-
lating to trafficking in contraband cigarettes), sections 2421-24 (relating
to white slave traffic), (C) any act which is indictable under title 29,
United States Code, section 186 (dealing with restrictions on payments
and loans to labor organizations) or section 501(c) (relating to embezzle-
ment from union funds), (D) any offense involving fraud connected with a
case under title 11 (except a case under section 157 of this title), fraud in
the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiv-
ing, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in a controlled sub-
stance or listed chemical (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled
Substances Act), punishable under any law of the United States, (E) any
act which is indictable under the Currency and Foreign Transactions Re-
porting Act, (F) any act which is indictable under the Immigration and
Nationality Act, section 274 (relating to bringing in and harboring certain
aliens), section 277 (relating to aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter
the United States), or section 278 (relating to importation of alien for im-
moral purpose) if the act indictable under such section of such Act was
committed for the purpose of financial gain, or (G) any act that is indicta-
ble under any provision listed in section 2332b(g)(5)(B).
18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2000).
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no non-enumerated act can constitute a predicate act of racketeer-
ing, regardless of its similarity to a specifically listed act.'0 2 In
addition, there is no requirement that a defendant be convicted of
any underlying predicate act before a civil RICO claim may be
brought against him.10 3
Plaintiffs bringing claims under section 1962(b) against bish-
ops and/or archbishops alleging acquisition or maintenance of an
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity may have a
more difficult time proving racketeering activity recognized by
RICO. Their claims would likely allege, as racketeering activities,
violations of section 1503 relating to obstruction of justice,10 4 sec-
tion 201 relating to bribery,' 08 and sections 1341 and 1343 relating
to mail and wire fraud, respectively.' 0 6
Claims brought against bishops and dioceses based upon sec-
tion 1503 will undoubtedly collide with First Amendment protec-
tions asserted by the defendants. 0 7 The Church will claim that
such matters regarding the handling of predator priests, including
failure to report abuse to the authorities, falls within the ambit of
the internal discretionary functioning of the Church, dictated by
Canon law and long-recognized as protected from the intrusion of
the State.'08 Claims brought against the bishops and dioceses
102. JOSEPH, supra note 21, at 80.
103. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, 473 U.S. 479, 493 (1985) ("[We can find no
support in [RICO's] history, its language, or considerations of policy for a require-
ment that a private treble-damages action under § 1964(c) can proceed only
against a defendant who has already been criminally convicted. To the contrary,
every indication is that no such requirement exists.").
104. See Maureen Hayden, National Suit Looks at Local Allegations, EVANS-
VILLE COURIER, May 8, 2002, at Al, available at 2002 WL 13695598 (describing a
lawsuit accusing all American bishops of being co-conspirators with the Vatican in
a plan to obstruct justice by keeping secret priest files and bribing some victims to
remain quiet); Ciolli, supra note 88 (describing a RICO suit brought against the
Diocese of Rockville Centre due to the Church's protection of priests and mainte-
nance of bank accounts for the purpose of paying off victims of sexual abuse).
105. See Ciolli, supra note 88.
106. See Priests as Racketeers?, supra note 15 (discussing a recent RICO claim
filed against former Bishop Anthony O'Connell and the Dioceses of both Jefferson
City, Missouri, and Knoxville, Tennessee and suggesting that plaintiffs in related
cases can press a RICO claim by showing the existence of conspiracy through at
least two telephone calls made in furtherance of the scheme).
107. See discussion infra Part VII.
108. See discussion infra Part VII; O'Reilly & Strasser, supra note 4, at 43-46
(discussing likely First Amendment challenges to intrusion into Church norms and
practices in the context of tort principles of negligent hiring and supervision and
negligent ecclesiastical hierarchy performance of duty).
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based on section 201 would also meet challenges based on entan-
glement with Church norms and practices. If plaintiffs could show
that they were offered money as an incentive to refrain from litiga-
tion against Church entities, their claims would be valid. How-
ever, the defendants might argue that maintenance of certain bank
accounts and even the offerings of money to victims constitute pro-
tected Church practices.
Claims based on mail and wire fraud would require a complex
analysis into the law of both racketeering acts. Generally, to state
a violation under the mail or wire fraud statutes, it is necessary to
show 1) a scheme to defraud, 2) participation by the defendant to
defraud, 3) specific intent to defraud, and 4) the use of the United
States wires or mails in furtherance of the scheme. 10 9 Plaintiffs
would attempt to show that by using the phones or mail, the defen-
dant bishop(s) and other Church authorities transferred known
predator priests to different locations where they later abused the
plaintiff-victims. Although plaintiffs may be able to show an ap-
pearance of a scheme to defraud parishioners, it is unlikely that
they can show the requisite intent necessary to prove fraud.
Courts have held that in order to allege a scheme to defraud, it is
"essential that the evidence show the defendant entertained an in-
tent to defraud."110 In addition, acts done in good faith without
any intent to defraud do not satisfy the mens rea necessary to state
a valid claim based on either section 1341 or 1343.111 Despite the
fact that plaintiffs may show that they relied on their bishops and
diocese to keep predator priests away from them, and that there is
an inherent deception in the knowing transfer of predator priests
to unsuspecting parishes, their section 1341 and section 1343
claims should fail due to the inability to prove that the Church au-
thorities acted with the intent to defraud. While the Church au-
thorities may have used the phones and mail to organize for the
transfer and/or reassignment of priests, it would be difficult to
prove that they did so with the knowledge and intent that the
priests would abuse again. It would be equally difficult to prove
109. JOSEPH, supra note 21, at 83.
110. See, e.g., Atlas Pile Driving Co. v. Dicon Fin. Co., 886 F.2d 986, 991 (8th
Cir. 1989) (holding that "schemes using deceptive practices to induce the unwary
to give up money or some other tangible property interest are within the scope" of
fraud for RICO purposes).
111. See O'Malley v. New York Transit Auth., 896 F.2d 704 (2d Cir 1990).
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that Church authorities acted in bad faith, especially considering
that most predator priests are reassigned only after counseling fol-
lowing allegations of sexual abuse. 112 However, if plaintiffs could
acquire enough evidence to show that Church authorities effectu-
ated the transfer of repeat offenders with knowledge that they
would likely strike again, courts might be willing to recognize an
intent to defraud on the part of such parties. Thus, although it will
be difficult to prove these racketeering activities under section
1962(b), courts may be willing to find the presence of fraud in some
circumstances.
E. Acquired or Maintained Any Interest in or Control Of
Standing for section 1962(b) purposes requires an injury re-
sulting from the defendant's acquisition or maintenance of an in-
terest in, or control over, the pertinent enterprise.113 Generally,
under section 1962(b), a plaintiff must allege a "specific nexus be-
tween control of a named enterprise and the alleged racketeering
activity."1 4 Whereas determination of an "interest" in any enter-
prise is a "fairly straightforward, objective determination,"' 1 5 "con-
trol" for section 1962(b) purposes is managerial in nature and
requires a showing of participation of the defendant in the "opera-
tion or management of the enterprise itself."1 6 Clearly, bishops,
archbishops, and other high-level Church authorities maintain
both an interest in, and often full control of individual dioceses and
the Church institution itself. Because plaintiffs will allege that
their injury resulted from the methods and tactics employed by de-
fendants in the operation and management of their enterprises
and that there was a nexus between their injuries and those ac-
tions, it is very likely that they could prove the necessary mainte-
nance of an interest in or control of the RICO enterprise.
112. See Eden Laikin & Steve Wick, Chapter and Verse of the Accusations,
NEWSDAY, Feb. 11, 2003, at A23, available at 2003 WL 12020492.
113. JOSEPH, supra note 21, at 47.
114. Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406 (3d Cir. 1991).
115. JOSEPH, supra note 21, at 47.
116. Rosemont Cogeneration Joint Venture v. N. States Power Co., Civ. No. 4-
90-279, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1504, at *22 (D. Minn. Jan. 18, 1991) (citing Ben-
nett v. Berg, 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir. 1983)).
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F. An Enterprise Engaged in or Affecting Commerce
The enterprise requirement is integral to all RICO claims.
Section 1961(4) defines "enterprise" to include "any individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any
union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
entity." 7 Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in United States v.
Turkette,l" 8 there was much debate over whether RICO intended
to include within the definition of "enterprise" only those organiza-
tions that are exclusively criminal.11 9 The Court found no restric-
tion "embraced by the definition: an enterprise includes any union
or group of individuals associated in fact," including both illegiti-
mate and legitimate enterprises. 120 In addition, the Court has ad-
ded that the enterprise need not be motivated by an economic
purpose.121
In their section 1962(b) claims, victims of clergy-related sexual
abuse would have to prove that the Church, as the employer of
predator priests and as an "enterprise" in itself, is an "enterprise
affecting interstate or foreign commerce" cognizable under
RICO. 122 Based on the statutory definition and precedent, these
plaintiffs would have little difficulty doing so. First, the Church is
a legal entity, centered in Vatican City and established throughout
the world. In many respects, it functions similarly to a large busi-
ness or corporation, responsible for its own existence and depen-
dant on the financial support of millions of Catholics world-
wide. 123 The Church is also made up of an unambiguous hierar-
chal structure, similar to most large business entities.124 In addi-
tion, the Church owns property throughout the world, has
117. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2000).
118. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
119. Id. at 578.
120. Id. at 580.
121. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 252 (1994).
122. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (2000).
123. Following its most recent census in 1998, the Vatican's Central Statistics
Office estimates that there are more than one billion Catholics worldwide. Vatican
Says More than One Billion Catholics Worldwide, CATHOLIC WORLD NEWS, May 8,
2002, available at http://www.cwnews.com/Browse/1998/05/7581.htm.
124. Arguably, it is this hierarchal structure that leads to "secretness, subter-
fuge, and arrogance" in the context of clergy sexual abuse. George Bryjak, The
Power Struggle Within the Catholic Church, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 29,
2002, at B9, available at 2002 WL 100358246.
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thousands of employees, owns billions in assets, 125 and clearly
holds itself out as a corporation whose goal and purpose is not
profit, but religion. Because the Church affects both interstate and
foreign commerce, and because a RICO enterprise need not have
an economic purpose or motivation following Scheidler,'26 the
Church would clearly satisfy the enterprise requirement under
RICO.
G. Injury to Business or Property
Although Sedima altered the understanding of RICO injury to
no longer require a "racketeering injury" independent of the harm
caused by the predicate acts,1 2 7 victims of clergy sexual abuse will
face a tremendously difficult challenge to prove the type of injury
compensable under the Act. Clearly, section 1964(c) of the civil
RICO statute itself, provides that "[a] person injured in his busi-
ness or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this
chapter may sue therefore."128 In Grogan v. Platt,129 the Eleventh
Circuit interpreted the words "business and property" as words of
limitation, strongly holding that had Congress intended for victims
to recover for all types of injuries suffered, it would have purpose-
fully omitted the terms "business and property" from the
statute. 30
To state a valid cause of action under RICO, plaintiff must
show a proprietary type of damage.' 31 Courts have not recognized
physical injury or emotional suffering as legitimate injuries to bus-
iness or property covered under the statute. 32 Although the Gro-
gan court gave merit to the argument that persons who are killed
or injured by RICO predicate acts may often suffer attenuated eco-
nomic and proprietary harm, the court expressly rejected the con-
tention: "We can do no more than interpret the statute according to
125. See Frank Gibney, Jr., Can a Church Go Broke?, TIME, June 3, 2002, at 50,
for a discussion of the Catholic Church's annual income, assets, and finances.
126. See discussion supra Part II.A-B.
127. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, 473 U.S. 479, 497 (1985).
128. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000).
129. 835 F.2d 844 (11th Cir. 1988).
130. Id. at 846 (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979)).
131. Id. at 847.
132. See id.; Berg v. First Interstate Ins. Co., 915 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1990);
Rylewicz v. Beaton Servs., Ltd., 888 F.2d 1175 (7th Cir. 1989); Fleischhauer v.
Feltner, 879 F.2d 1290 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1074 (1990); Drake v.
B.F. Goodrich Co., 82 F.2d 638 (6th Cir. 1986).
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its plain language and as we believe Congress intended the lan-
guage to be understood, and we do not understand Congress to
have authorized recovery for [personal] injuries."133 Additionally,
the economic aspects of personal injuries, such as loss of earnings
due to physical injury or pecuniary loss due to emotional distress,
are not the types of injury recognized by RICO.' 34
Since most victims of clergy sexual abuse will only be able to
allege mental and emotional injuries, it is unlikely that they will
be able to establish standing under RICO. In addition, court prece-
dent as in Grogan seems to proscribe elaborate theories of injury to
business or property resulting either directly or indirectly from
those personal injuries. 135 Thus, even though section 1961(1) ex-
plicitly lists as racketeering offenses sections 2251, 2251A, 2252,
and 2260 of Title 18, all of which relate to the sexual exploitation of
children, 136 RICO is explicitly drafted to compensate those injured
in their business or property by commission of those specific acts,
rather than those injured only physically and emotionally.
Lawyers for victims of sexual abuse may attempt to create
rather elaborate theories in order to satisfy the injury requirement
under RICO. However, if the core of the complaint is the physical
or emotional injury sustained due to the commission of predicate
acts, their suits will likely face dismissal. On the other hand, if
plaintiffs can artfully allege an injury to business or property sus-
tained as a result of the actions of the Church hierarchy or in con-
nection with alleged pay-offs or bribery attempts in the context of
clergy sexual abuse, courts might accept their RICO claims. How-
ever, precedent, along with the need to curtail RICO's liberal inter-
pretation, may influence courts to deny the validity of such injuries
as emanating from what are, for all intents and purposes, purely
physical or emotional injuries.
133. Grogan, 835 F.2d at 848. The court elaborated on its holding: "For exam-
ple, a person physically injured in a fire whose origin was arson is not given a right
to recover for his personal injuries; damage to his business or his building is the
type of injury for which § 1964(c) permits suit." Id.
134. JOSEPH, supra note 21, at 30.
135. The court left open the question of whether the economic aspects of dam-
ages resulting directly from personal injuries could, as a theoretical matter, be
considered an injury to business or property, and the Supreme Court has yet to
accept a case dealing with this issue. See Fleischhauer v. Feltner, 879 F.2d 1290
(6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1074 (1990).
136. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2000).
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H. By Reason of the Defendant's Acquisition or Maintenance of
the Interest in, or Control of, the Enterprise
Section 1964(c) imposes a proximate cause requirement on
plaintiffs attempting to bring a claim under the statute. In short,
the proximate cause requirement under section 1964(c) holds that
the criminal conduct alleged as a violation of section 1962 must
either directly or indirectly injure plaintiffs business or prop-
erty.137 If the RICO violation is a substantial factor causing the
plaintiff's injury, provided that the injury is reasonably foreseeable
as a natural consequence of the acts, proximate cause will be satis-
fied. 138 Because a proximate cause analysis requires a factual in-
quiry, courts usually consider several factors: whether plaintiff's
injury was a direct or derivative result of the alleged RICO viola-
tion; whether the plaintiff was the intended target of the act;
whether independent causes have intervened between the injury
and the violation; and whether there is a risk of multiple
recoveries.139
A proximate cause analysis would be necessary only if courts
were to find the injuries alleged by victims of sexual abuse to be
recognized injuries to business or property under RICO. However,
plaintiffs attempting to prove that Church authorities proximately
caused their injuries by transferring or failing to supervise
predator priests might face a difficult task establishing an ade-
quate nexus between those activities and plaintiffs subsequent in-
jury. While the defendants would argue that the independent
criminal acts of the priests would break any chain of causation,
victims would argue that Church authorities breached their legal
duty to prevent the risk of future abuse. Additionally, the risk of
multiple recoveries vis-A-vis negligence-based causes of action
might affect a court's reasoning. Again, a causation analysis would
only be necessary if the injury alleged in plaintiffs complaint is
first found to be sufficient. Because it is unlikely that the type of
personal injury alleged by victims of sexual abuse will constitute
injury to business or property for RICO purposes, it would be un-
necessary for the court to examine whether such injury was proxi-
mately caused by defendants' actions.
137. Haraco, Inc. v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984),
afi'd per curiam, 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
138. JOSEPH, supra note 21, at 36.
139. Id. at 37.
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IV. APPLICABILITY OF 1962(c) TO SEXUALLY ABUSIVE PRIESTS
AND UPPER-LEVEL CHURCH OFFICIALS
To state a valid claim under section 1962(c), plaintiff must al-
lege and prove that:
A) a person,
B) employed by or associated with an
C) enterprise that is engaged in or affects interstate or for-
eign commerce,
D) conducted or participated in the conduct of the enterprise's
affairs
E) through a pattern of
F) racketeering activity or collection of an unlawful debt
G) while acting with the necessary mens rea resulting in,
H) injury to plaintiffs business or property. 140
A. Person
For section 1962(c) purposes, the "person" who commits the
criminal wrongdoing must be distinct from the "enterprise" whose
affairs that person is "conduct[ing] or participat[ing] in con-
ducting."141 Generally, this distinction applies because section
1962(c) pertains only to persons associated with or employed by an
enterprise. 142 Because only the "person" is liable under section
1962(c), this approach is logical and favored in most circuits. 143
Victims of clergy-related sexual abuse could easily prove that both
upper-level Church officials and individual predator priests consti-
tute "persons" for their respective section 1962(c) claims. Depend-
ing on how each plaintiff were to formalize his or her pleadings,
plaintiffs would have little difficulty proving that bishops and
archbishops, as employees, are distinct from their diocese or the
Catholic Church itself, while individual priests, also employees,
are distinct from their respective parishes.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 50.
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., Arzuaga-Collazo v. Oriental Fed. Sav. Bank, 913 F.2d 5 (1st Cir.
1990); Old Time Enters., Inc. v. Int'l Coffee Corp., 862 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. 1989);
Haraco, Inc. v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984) aff'd per
curiam, 473 U.S. 606 (1985). But see Cox v. United States Steel Carnegie Pension
Fund, 17 F,3d 1386 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1110 (1995).
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B. Employed by or Associated With
Although determination of the "associated with" requirement
of section 1962(c) is often a difficult question of fact in light of the
totality of the circumstances of each case, "the 'employed by' side of
the equation is relatively straightforward." 144 Because both high-
level Church authorities and individual priests are each employees
of their respective parishes, dioceses and the Church institution in
general, they are "employed by or associated with" for section
1962(c) purposes.
C. An Enterprise Engaged in or Affecting Interstate or Foreign
Commerce
As discussed above, individual parishes, dioceses, and the
Church each constitute an "enterprise engaged in or affecting in-
terstate or foreign commerce" for RICO purposes. 145 Each func-
tions as a business entity and has employees, assets, property, and
its own independent structure and support base. 146 Again, be-
cause a RICO enterprise need not have an economic motivation or
purpose following Schiedler, plaintiffs would have little difficulty
proving the existence of an enterprise for their respective section
1962(c) claims against Church officials and predator priests.
D. Conducted or Participated in Conduct of the Enterprise's
Affairs
The Supreme Court has interpreted "conduct or participate" to
require involvement of the defendant in the operation or manage-
ment of the enterprise. 147 Specifically, the Court held that, "in or-
der to 'participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprise's affairs,' one must have some part in directing those
affairs." 148 Additionally, Reves v. Ernst & Young149 established
144. JOSEPH, supra note 21, at 55.
145. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2000); see discussion supra Part III.F.
146. The independent business nature of individual dioceses is reflected by the
need for dioceses in Santa Rosa, California; Dallas, Texas; Santa Fe, New Mexico;
and Tucson, Arizona, to each sell or mortgage property, borrow money from other
dioceses, or borrow from parish savings accounts to pay multimillion-dollar settle-
ments in clergy sexual misconduct cases. Costs Have Church Reeling, supra note
3.
147. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 179 (1993).
148. Id.
149. 507 U.S. 170 (1993).
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that liability under section 1962(c) is not solely limited to upper
management of an enterprise, but also extends to lower-level par-
ticipants under the direction of upper management. 150 Since
Reves, courts have held that lower-level figures within an enter-
prise "operate or manage" if they exercise broad discretion or
knowingly implement criminal decisions. 151
Bishops, archbishops, and other high-level Church authorities
would most likely qualify as "operating or managing" their respec-
tive dioceses, and perhaps the Church itself, for section 1962(c)
purposes. Clearly, bishops and archbishops are the principle con-
trolling powers within their respective dioceses. On the other
hand, allegations that such individuals operate or manage the af-
fairs of the Catholic Church itself may fail due to the size of the
enterprise, the number of similarly situated employees, and the ex-
istence of the Pope and governing body of the Church. Accordingly,
courts would be hard-pressed to draw a line with respect to
whether such Church officials are lower or higher-rung employees
for RICO purposes.
Analysis of whether individual priests "operate or manage"
their respective enterprises would also be contingent on the claims
made by each plaintiff. Allegations that a priest conducted or par-
ticipated in the conduct of his respective parish would more likely
fall under section 1962(c), while allegations that each priest was
conducting the affairs of the diocese or Church itself would require
an analysis as set forth in United States v. Diaz15 2 and United
States v. Posada-Rios,5 3 which focuses on the exercise of broad
discretion or knowing implementation of criminal decisions. Be-
cause the sexually abusive conduct of priests constitute indepen-
dent and intentional criminal acts, it is unlikely that such actions
could be interpreted as implementations of criminal decisions
made by the diocese or Church administration.
E. Through a Pattern of Racketeering Activity
Based on the above analysis of the "pattern" requirement,154
victims of clergy-related sexual abuse should have little difficulty
150. Id.
151. See, e.g., United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 1999).
152. Id.
153. 158 F.3d 832 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1792 (1999).
154. See discussion supra Part III.C.
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proving a "pattern of racketeering activity" in their section 1962(c)
claims against individual priests. Instances of at least two acts of
sexual abuse by a priest would clearly be "related" under RICO due
to similar purposes, results, participants, victims, and methods of
commission. Plaintiffs would also fulfill the "continuity" require-
ment by showing both a closed-ended period of sexual abuse occur-
ring during a certain time period and an open-ended continual
threat of repetition and recidivism. 155
Similarly, plaintiffs would have little difficulty proving a pat-
tern in their section 1962(c) claims against bishops, archbishops,
and high-level Church authorities. As stated above in reference to
section 1962(b) claims, whether plaintiffs were to allege two acts of
obstruction of justice, mail or wire fraud, or bribery, the predicate
acts would likely be considered as "related" in both purpose and
method of commission. 156 In addition, a showing of a closed period
of repeated action, threat of repetition evidenced by the character
of the crimes, and the similar handling of sex scandals would es-
tablish "continuity" for RICO pattern purposes.
F. Racketeering Activity
Claims brought under section 1962(c) naming individual
priests as defendants would undoubtedly allege the specifically
enumerated racketeering activity contained in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251,
2251A, 2252, and 2260, "relating to the sexual exploitation of chil-
dren."1 57 Because the sexual exploitation of children is the central
element of the claims against predator priests, plaintiffs would
easily establish a racketeering act under RICO. Considering that
such conduct is specifically listed as a predicate act in section
1961(1), the sexual misconduct of predator priests would certainly
be considered racketeering activity.
However, plaintiffs would face an arduous task in proving
"racketeering activity" for section 1962(c) claims against bishops,
155. Recidivism is defined as "a tendency to relapse into a previous condition or
mode of behavior." WFBsTER's THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1895 (1986). For an
explanation of the analyses, hypotheses, issues, and statistics of recidivism in the
context of child sexual abuse, see Recidivism in Sex Offenders, May 2001, at Center
for the Sex Offender Management website, http://www.csom.org/pubs/recidsexof.
html.
156. See discussion supra Part III.C.
157. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2000).
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archbishops, and high-level Church authorities. 158 Just as with
section 1962(b) claims, if plaintiffs are able to prove the defen-
dant's commission of racketeering acts of bribery, mail or wire
fraud, and obstruction of justice, they would satisfy the require-
ment of "racketeering activity" needed for section 1962(c)
claims. 159
G. While Acting with the Necessary Mens Rea
As stated above, in order to prove liability under RICO, plain-
tiffs must prove that a defendant possessed the "specific intent as-
sociated with the various underlying predicate offenses," 160 while a
minority of circuits require proof of the "specific intent to partici-
pate in the overall RICO enterprise."161 In their section 1962(c)
claims against individual priests, victims of sexual abuse would
specifically allege that the defendant possessed the mens rea to
commit the racketeering activity of sexual exploitation of a minor
and would likely encounter insanity and other defenses associated
with pedophilia. Determination of the mens rea of the priests
would require close examination of circumstances surrounding the
actual misconduct, including an inquiry into the priest's ability to
form the requisite intent to commit criminal acts in the context of
his pedophilia or similar mental deficiency.
Likewise, section 1962(c) claims against bishops, archbishops,
and other high-level Church authorities would require proof of
mens rea for each alleged racketeering act. As discussed above in
reference to section 1962(b), 162 plaintiffs could prove intent to com-
mit predicate acts through failure of the defendants to report alle-
gations of sexual abuse to authorities, through representations
made by defendants to victims to effectuate silence and keep com-
plaints out of court, and by evidence that such individuals, like for-
mer Cardinal Law of Boston, knew that transferred pedophile
priests were certain to abuse again and put children in harm's way
by allowing such priests to remain in parish work. 163
158. See discussion supra Part III.D.
159. See discussion supra Part IL.D (regarding a more in-depth discussion of
the "racketeering activity" requirement in section 1962(b)).
160. JOSEPH, supra note 21, at 121; see discussion supra Part III.B.
161. See Zolfaghari v. Sheikholeslami, 943 F.2d 451 (4th Cir. 1991).
162. See discussion supra Part III.B.
163. Church Moves to Dismiss Abuse Suits, PROVIDENCE J., Jan. 18, 2003, at
A2, available at 2003 WL 7051536.
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H. Resulting in Injury to Plaintiffs Business or Property
The analysis of the "injury to business or property" require-
ment would be the same for all section 1962 claims. Therefore, as
discussed above,' 64 it is unlikely that plaintiffs will be able to ade-
quately prove injury to business or property in their section 1962(c)
claims against both individual priests and Church authorities. Be-
cause no court has recognized that RICO authorizes recovery for
personal injuries or the economic damages or emotional distress
resulting therefrom, claims stemming from physical abuse do not
fall within the intended scope of RICO, in accordance with the ex-
press wording of section 1964(c).
V. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
RICO was significantly modeled after the Clayton Act,' 65
which contains a four-year statute of limitations. 166 Accordingly,
the Supreme Court has found that civil RICO actions also carry a
four-year statute of limitations, considering the similarities of pur-
pose and structure of the two acts.167 Following the Court's recent
ruling in Rotella v. Wood,168 this four-year statute of limitations
begins to run at the time of the discovery of the injury caused by
the predicate act.' 69 This "injury discovery rule" sets forth that
"each time a plaintiff suffers an injury caused by a violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1962, a cause of action to recover damages based on that
injury accrues ... at the time [plaintiffl discovered or should have
discovered the injury." °70 The Rotella Court held that both the "in-
jury and pattern discovery rule"17 and "last predicate act rule"17 2
164. See discussion supra Part III.G.
165. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
166. JOSEPH, supra note 21, at 174.
167. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987).
168. 528 U.S. 549 (2000).
169. Id. at 555.
170. Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096, 1102 (2d Cir. 1988).
171. Under the "injury and pattern discovery" rule, "a civil RICO claim accrues
only when the claimant discovers, or should discover, both an injury and a pattern
of RICO activity." Rotella, 528 U.S. at 553.
172. Under the "last predicate act" rule, the "statute begins to run when the
plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the last injury or last predicate act in
the pattern, whether or not the plaintiff himself has suffered any injury from the
last act." Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 180 (1984).
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were not ideal for RICO's purposes on a number of different
grounds. 173
If a court was to entertain civil RICO suits brought by victims
of clergy sexual abuse, their claims would face strong statute of
limitations defenses. Because most instances of clergy sexual
abuse occur during the youth of victims, an automatic four-year
statute of limitations accruing from the date of the sexual exploita-
tion would bar a large percentage of claims made by those victims
later in adulthood. In response, courts have begun to recognize
"repressed memory syndrome" or "dissociative amnesia" for statute
of limitations purposes. 174
Child victims of sexual abuse are often psychologically unable
to cope with abuse and as a result develop coping strategies to
avoid both reminders and memories of traumatic events.' 7 5 As a
consequence, childhood victims of sexual abuse commonly experi-
ence amnesia or memory loss following such high levels of stress
and trauma, burying all memory of the abuse17 6 through a complex
mental process known as "repressed memory syndrome" (RMS) or
"dissociative amnesia.' u77
Because victims of childhood sexual abuse experience an abun-
dance of emotional and psychological problems in their lives, they
often turn to psychotherapy, where various techniques are em-
ployed to recover such repressed memories. 178 In the course of
173. Rotella, 528 U.S. at 555-60.
174. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Doe v.
LaBrosse, 588 A.2d 605 (R.I. 1991); Evans v. Eckelman, 216 Cal. App. 3d 1609
(Cal. App. 1. Dist. 1990).
175. Laura Johnson, Litigating Nightmares: Repressed Memories of Childhood
Sexual Abuse, 51 S.C. L. REV. 939, 944 (2000) (citing Gary M. Ernsdorff & Eliza-
beth F. Loftus, Let Sleeping Memories Lie? Words of Caution About Tolling the
Statute of Limitations in Cases of Memory Repression, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 129, 135-36 (1993)).
176. Id. at 942-45.
177. The American Psychiatric Association has officially recognized Repressed
Memory Syndrome referring to it by its medical term, "dissociative amnesia"
stating:
The essential feature of Dissociative Amnesia is an inability to recall im-
portant personal information, usually of a traumatic or stressful nature,
that is too extensive to be explained by normal forgetfulness .... This
disorder involves a reversible memory impairment in which memories of
personal experience cannot be retrieved in a verbal form (or, if tempora-
rily retrieved, cannot be wholly retained in consciousness).
Id. at 943.
178. Id. at 945-46.
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therapy, victims often recover memories of their abuse, but usually
long after the expiration of applicable statutes of limitation.' 7 9
However, based on the strong scientific evidence in support of the
theory, several states have recognized RMS as a valid method of
injury discovery for statute of limitations purposes, 180 and to date,
at least twenty-one states toll the statute of limitations in civil
cases when a victim of child sexual abuse has repressed all mem-
ory of the incident.' 8 ' In addition, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit has held Washington's statutory
discovery rule applicable to claims based on the sexual abuse of
children not only in "cases involving repressed memories, but also
in cases involving delayed discovery of the causal connection be-
tween the remembered assault and the injury."18 2
If a court were to entertain section 1962(b) and (c) claims
against priests and Church officials, the victims of preterit sexual
abuse could avoid a statute of limitations bar by asserting RMS.
Because the Court gave its approval to the "injury discovery rule"
in Rotella, courts would likely be willing to accept the doctrine in
179. See id. at 939-40.
180. See id. at 952, n.117 (calling attention to the states that have enacted laws
based on Repressed Memory Syndrome):
ALASKA STAT. § 9.10.140 (Michie 1999); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-130
(Michie Supp. 1999); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1 (West Supp. 1999);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-80-103.7 (West 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 95.11(7) (West Supp. 1999); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/13-202.2 (West
Supp. 1999); IowA CODE ANN. § 614.8A (West 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-523 (Supp. 1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 260, § 4C (West Supp.
1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 752-C (West Supp. 1999); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 541.073 (West Supp. 1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.046 (West
Supp. 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-216 (1999); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 11.215 (Michie 1998); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:4 (Supp. 1992); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 24:61 B-1 (West Supp. 1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-30
(Michie Supp. 1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 95(6) (West Supp. 2000);
OR. REV. STAT. § 12.117 (Supp. 1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-51 (1997); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 26-10-25 (Michie 1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25.1
(Supp. 1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 522 (Supp. 1999); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-249(6) (Michie Supp. 1999); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.340
(West Supp. 1999); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.587 (West 1997); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 1-3-105 (Michie 1999).
181. Mick Frasca, Tolling the Statute of Limitations in Childhood Sexual Abuse
Civil Cases, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUEs 45, 50 (2000).
182. Arnold v. Amtrak, 13 Fed. Appx. 573, 576, available at 2001 WL 725123,
at *2 (9th Cir. June 27, 2001) (concluding that the appropriate focus of the stat-
ute's discovery rule is to determine when the victim becomes aware of the nexus
between the injury he claims and the sexual assault, not necessarily the simple
remembrance of the injury).
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relation to RICO if supported by sufficient evidence and expert tes-
timony on a case by case basis.'8 3 Assuming the existence of a
valid substantive RICO claim on the merits, courts might be will-
ing to accept the Ninth Circuit's position, which interpreted the
tolling of Washington's statute of limitations as not when the vic-
tim first remembered the sexual abuse, but at the later date when
the victim understood the nexus between his emotional problems
and the abuse. 84
VI. VIcAIous LIABILITY
Imputation to the individual dioceses or the Catholic Church
of the RICO liability of priests, bishops, and archbishops would
serve as another viable option for victims of sexual abuse. Because
of the Church's formidable assets and wealth, plaintiffs may desire
to apply respondeat superior claims against the Church for the
acts of its employees, effectively reaching the "deep pocket" of the
wealthy entity.
Respondeat superior claims against the diocese and Church
cannot be attached to section 1962(c) claims against individual
priests. Courts have found that imposition of vicarious liability for
such claims would "improperly evade [section 1962(c)'s] statutory
requirement that the person and the enterprise be distinct."18 5 In
Landry v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n,l s 6 the Fifth Circuit found that it
would be "incongruous" to hold an enterprise vicariously liable for
the acts of its employee or agent under section 1962(c), adding that
"if this were the rule, all legal enterprises could be found liable
under RICO if their employees or agents were involved in perpe-
trating predicate acts through or against them... [tihis is contrary
to the rule Congress meant to impose....-"1 8 7 Thus, vicarious lia-
bility may be applied under section 1962(c) only where the organi-
zation is distinct from the enterprise and its imposition would not
operate as an "impermissible end-run around the mandatory dis-
tinction between person and enterprise." 8 8 Because section
1962(c) claims would assert that priests have committed predicate
183. See Johnson, supra note 175, at 961-63.
184. Arnold, 13 Fed. Appx. at 576.
185. JOSEPH, supra note 21, at 130.
186. 901 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 895 (1990).
187. Id. at 425.
188. JOSEPH, supra note 21, at 130.
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acts as employees or agents of the Church, acceptance of vicarious
liability with such claims would effectively ignore the distinctive-
ness requirement of section 1962(c).
Vicarious liability may be available to victims of clergy sexual
abuse in section 1962(b) claims against bishops and archbishops.
Unlike section 1962(c) claims, all circuits impose vicarious liability
on section 1962(b) claims because the statute itself does not distin-
guish between the "person" and "enterprise."18 9 In Liquid Air
Corp. v. Rogers, 190 the Seventh Circuit held that vicarious liability
was not barred for section 1962(b) claims, flatly disagreeing with
the district court's finding that section 1962(b) claims require that
the "person" and "enterprise" be distinct as required for section
1962(c) claims. 191 The court found that because the defendant cor-
poration had benefited from the criminal conduct, the corporation
was properly held liable under vicarious liability. 192
To determine vicarious liability under sections 1962(a) and (b),
courts have articulated a variety of standards. 193 "Some courts
distinguish between upper-level and lower-level employees, requir-
ing express or implicit authorization of senior management for
misconduct committed by subordinates." 194 Other courts distin-
guish between corporations that are passive tools of the criminal
actor and those that actively participate in it, finding vicarious lia-
bility in the latter case. 195 Another approach focuses on whether
the organization benefited from the RICO violation as the "critical
criterion in assessing the propriety of imputing liability."196 Gen-
erally, each approach to analyzing vicarious liability looks princi-
pally at the level of the agent or employee whose conduct is at issue
and "whether that person was acting within the scope of his or her
authority when committing the violations." 197 However, under
both section 1962(a) and (b), vicarious liability is regularly im-
189. Id. at 131.
190. 834 F.2d 1297 (7th Cir. 1987), overruling Bruss Co. v. Allnet Communica-
tions Servs., Inc., 606 F. Supp. 401 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
191. Id. at 1307.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. R.E. Davis Chem. Corp. v. Nalco Chem. Co., 757 F. Supp. 1499 (N.D. Ill.
1990).
195. See, e.g., Collective Fed. Savings Bank v. Creel, 746 F. Supp. 1307 (M.D.
La. 1990).
196. Liquid Air Corp., 834 F.2d at 1307.
197. JOSEPH, supra note 21, at 133.
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posed - in all circuits - because those subsections do not distin-
guish between the "person" liable and the "enterprise" used.198
Thus, vicarious liability is available for section 1962(b) violations.
Theoretically, victims of clergy sexual abuse can hold both dio-
ceses and the Church vicariously liable for the RICO violations of
bishops and archbishops if they can prove some express or implicit
acquiescence in their conduct by the upper levels of the Church's
hierarchy. Thus, depending on the forum, plaintiffs may be re-
quired either to show that the Church benefited from the miscon-
duct of the bishops and archbishops or that the bishops and
archbishops actively participated in the criminal conduct to war-
rant imposition of vicarious liability to the Church. Because most
victims allege a complicated conspiracy of silence throughout the
Church hierarchy and, as in one case, among all American dio-
ceses, 199 vicarious liability is a very attractive legal tool. Utiliza-
tion of vicarious liability to reach individual dioceses and the
Church itself would hold those responsible for the furtherance of
the alleged conspiracy accountable, consistent with the underlying
policy of RICO "to cleanse the market of corrupt businesses and
enterprises, not innocent ones."200 Considering that many clergy
sexual abuse claims allege that Church authorities were aware of
reports of sexual abuse, quietly paid settlements, and made trans-
fer decisions, vicarious liability for their actions within the scope of
their employment seems both fair and just.
Assuming their section 1962(b) claims are valid, victims may
still have a difficult time acquiring the evidence to prove acquies-
cence, involvement, or benefit from the alleged misconduct in order
to prove vicarious liability against dioceses and the Church. Fur-
thermore, attempts by courts to examine the inner-workings and
dealings of the Church to help assess liability may unconstitution-
ally interfere with the internal affairs of the Church and would
certainly meet strong opposition on such grounds.201
198. Id. at 131.
199. See Robert Jablon, Four Accuse L.A. Cardinal of Covering Up Sex Abuses:
Two Suits Under Federal Racketeering Law Allege Robert Mahoney Protected
Pedophile Priests, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Apr. 30, 2002, at 1, available at 2002 WL
17139516.
200. JOSEPH, supra note 21, at 134.
201. See discussion infra Part VII.
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VII. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY DEFENSE
Section 1962(b) claims against Church hierarchy would likely
face First Amendment challenges of excessive entanglement with
religious affairs. The basis of such objections would be that deter-
mination of the liability of Church authorities under RICO inevita-
bly requires examination of the ecclesiastical actions of the Church
itself, and would, as elucidated by the Supreme Court in Serbian
Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,20 2 "undermine the gen-
eral rule that religious controversies are not the proper subject of
civil court inquiry, and that a civil court must accept the ecclesias-
tical decisions of the church tribunals as it finds them."20 3 Argua-
bly, the decisions of the bishops, archbishops, and other high-
ranking members of the Church with regard to the handling of
predator priests would fall within the internal discipline of the
Church, which is governed by Canon law.20 4 Because the Church
contains its own prohibitions, penalties, sanctions, and methods 20 5
for dealing with various violations and criminal actions by priests,
inquiry into the failure of Church authorities to handle predator
priests in more socially prudent manners often clashes with the
Canon's mandates. 20 6 The Canon's governance of internal disci-
pline methods and practices would make such inquiries a judicial
tightrope. 20 7
202. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
203. Id. at 713.
204. O'Reilly & Strasser, supra note 4, at 46.
205. See JOHN P. BEAL ET AL., NEW COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF CANON LAW,
1525-1604 (2000) (providing commentary on Book VI of the Canon, which outlines
the sanctions in the Church, 1983 CODE cC.1311-1399).
206. See id. at 1543; see 1983 CODE c. 1324 (providing that "the perpetrator of a
violation is not exempt from penalty, but the penalty established by the law or
precept must be tempered or a penance employed in its place ... [glenerally, the
Church's penal order has three main purposes: repairing scandal, restoring justice,
and reforming the offender."); see BEAL ET AL., supra note 205, at 1558 (accord-
ingly, Church authorities do not impose penalties too quickly, but should use all
available non-penal legal-pastoral options before imposing penalties).
207. In Nutt v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese, 921 F. Supp. 66 (D. Conn.
1995), the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut refused to
recognize the Church's First Amendment argument that inquiry into the negligent
hiring and supervision of predator priests represented an impermissible entangle-
ment with protected ecclesiastical concerns. Id. at 74-75. The court found that the
First Amendment did not create a blanket tort immunity for religious institutions.
Id. at 72-74. However, in Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780
(Wisc. 1995), the Supreme Court of Wisconsin refused to inquire into the hiring
practices of the Church in a negligent hiring and retention case since such deter-
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Although the First Amendment may protect from judicial
scrutiny the transfer and reassignment decisions of high-ranking
Church officials, those actors may not be able to mount a First
Amendment defense to some of the other racketeering allegations
made by RICO plaintiffs, including, but not necessarily limited to,
mail fraud, wire fraud, and bribery of victims. Although the
Church authorities might argue that Serbian's rule applies to all
internal functioning of the Church, First Amendment protection
does not extend to criminal actions, considering the fundamental
tenet that "the First Amendment does not insulate a church or its
members from judicial inquiry when a charge is made that their
activities violate a penal statute."208 Thus, inquiry into the crimi-
nal conduct of Church officials would be generally permissible, al-
though subject to other potential difficulties. The pastoral
privilege might work to shield the communications made by the
sexually abusive priest to his bishop outside of the confessional,
while the internal investigations of the Church in response to
charges of sexual misconduct may also be protected under the work
product exception, which privileges material acquired during prep-
aration for anticipated litigation. 20 9 In addition, an issue of abso-
lute treaty privilege could arise as a result of the "dual nature of
the Papal Nuncio, the Vatican representative to the [United
States'] bishops, who may have a role in the hierarchal process of
Vatican dismissal of an errant priest."210 Because the files held in
the office of the Papal Nuncio are immune from civil discovery
under "its treaty role as the Vatican's ambassador to the United
States," a civil subpoena seeking a personnel record submitted by a
mination would require interpretation of Church canons and internal Church poli-
cies and practices. Id. at 790. One court has found that the First Amendment does
not preclude a negligent hiring claim where a diocese knew of a priest's problems
of depression, low self-esteem, and his struggle with his sexual identity. See Moses
v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 320, 328 (Colo. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1137
(1994). Thus, determination of whether certain inquiries unconstitutionally in-
fringe on the protected internal functioning of the Church is a very difficult task.
Id. at 336.
208. United States v. Snowden, 770 F.2d 393, 398 (4th Cir. 1985).
209. The pastoral privilege doctrine shields admissions made by priests that
generally are "confessional in nature or in the nature of 'religious counseling.'"
O'Reilly & Strasser, supra note 4, at 62.
210. O'Reilly & Strasser, supra note 4, at 62.
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bishop to the Papal Nuncio would be "opposed on grounds of diplo-
matic immunity."211
Because the section 1962(b) claims against high-level employ-
ees of the Church allege criminal predicate acts which are prohib-
ited by numerous penal statutes, privilege and First Amendment
defenses will fail. This is consistent with the long-recognized view
that religion, though protected, "must be subordinate to the crimi-
nal laws of [our] country."212 Thus, although Canon law governs
the Church, and the First Amendment ensures against govern-
mental entanglement with the internal affairs of the Church,
neither will protect bishops, archbishops, and other Church offi-
cials from liability for criminal conduct. Although it may be diffi-
cult for victims to amass enough evidence to prove their claims,
they must not be precluded from presenting their claims by a
shield of invincibility masquerading as the First Amendment.
CONCLUSION
Although section 1964(c) of the Racketeering Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act is an attractive theory of recovery for
victims of sexual assault, it is unsuitable for several reasons.
First, and most importantly, the injuries alleged by victims of
clergy sexual abuse, against both the individual priests under sec-
tion 1962(c) and the high-ranking Church authorities under sec-
tion 1962(b), are not the types of injury to "business or property"
intended to be covered by section 1964(c). No matter how craftily
pleaded, the injuries to victims of sexual exploitation are, at their
core, personal and emotional. Although, for all intents and pur-
poses, the charges made against the Church allege a very organ-
ized and complicated scheme aimed at concealing wrongdoing
within the Church, and such concealment resembles what one
211. Id. O'Reilly and Strasser add that such files would be absolutely privi-
leged from ordinary subpoenas, but if the plaintiff names the Vatican as a party
defendant in the lawsuit, and meets other requirements for inclusion of the Vati-
can as a tortfeasor, then discovery of the relevant files would be permitted under
ordinary civil procedure rules. Id. at 63 n.244 ("Few plaintiffs will opt to sue the
Vatican, however, because to do so requires waiver of any punitive damages as a
prerequisite to jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1994); proof of agent relationship of
the priest to the Vatican, because such an agency is required to gain jurisdiction;
and proof that the conduct was within the agent's scope of employment, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a)(5) (1994).").
212. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342-43 (1890).
232 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:193
would liken to an "organized crime" entity, the failure to allege the
type of injury cognizable would nullify a civil RICO suit in the con-
text of clergy sexual abuse. However, given the previously unfore-
seen RICO decisions in Sedima, McMonagle, and Scheidler, an
expanded view of the "injury to business or property" requirement
may not be far off. As more and more RICO claims are brought
against "non-mafia" and non-underworld defendants, the injury re-
quirement specified in section 1964(c) might slowly erode through
liberal interpretation of "business or property."
Second, alternative avenues of recovery are available to vic-
tims of clergy sexual abuse. Causes of action against individual
priests for assault and clergy malpractice, along with claims
against bishops and other Church authorities based on negligent
hiring and supervision, respondeat superior, and agency law, have
all been recognized in a number of states and jurisdictions.213
More well-suited causes of action benefit both the plaintiffs, whose
burden of proof might be less burdensome when compared to such
a complex statute as RICO, and the courts, which will save time by
avoiding baseless, ill-contrived, or unintended claims under the
statute.
Third, application of RICO in clergy sexual abuse cases to
priests and other Church authorities might represent a "point of no
return" for the statute, permitting its use in any case where an
injured party alleges wrongdoing by any corporation, partnership,
organization, or other group of individuals. As stated above, RICO
was enacted as part of Congress's war against organized, under-
world crime families. Although the statute's broad language and
construction has resulted in its application outside the sphere of
organized crime, there is strong evidence in the legislative history
of the statute that such application was not intended. The Senate
Committee's Statement of Findings and Purpose for the Organized
Crime Control Act focused exclusively on organized crime and the
effect that it has on legitimate business, industry, and the national
economy.214 Moreover, in the congressional debates, Senator Mc-
Clellan voiced the opinion that RICO was intended only for use
against organized criminals: "[Ulnless an individual not only com-
213. See O'Reilly & Strasser, supra note 4 (summarizing and examining the
various theories of recovery utilized against both priests, high-ranking Church em-
ployees, and the Church institution itself).
214. 115 CONG. REC. S1861, 9568 (1969).
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mits such an enumerated crime but engaged in a pattern of such
violations, and uses the pattern to obtain or operate an interest in
an interstate business, he is not made subject to proceedings under
[RICO]."215 Another RICO supporter, Representative Richard A.
Poff, asserted that RICO "does not violate the civil liberties of
those who are not engaged in organized crime, but who nonethe-
less are within the incidental reach of provisions primarily in-
tended to affect organized crime."216
On the other hand, application of RICO to its intended sphere
of underworld crime is not as easily executed as it is suggested.
Although the average American's concept of "organized crime" is
unfailingly tied to the "Mafioso" image made famous by films like
"The Godfather"21 7 and "Goodfellas," 21s true organized crime ex-
tends far beyond the prosciutto and provolone covered tables of
"The Sopranos" 219 and the Italian, Russian, and Irish "mobs" com-
monly featured in weekly A&E cable specials.220 Should RICO ap-
ply only to these entities and not to abortion protestors, legitimate
corporations, and even religious organizations that are analogous
to those "Mafiosi," and may systematically commit many of the
same acts so intertwined with the popular concepts of the mafia
such as bribery, fraud, embezzlement, robbery, and murder? In
the face of this complex argument, it is necessary for Congress to
intervene by amendment to carefully define and curtail RICO's ap-
plication. But in what manner, and with what limitations this is to
be done requires a complex inquiry: how should Congress, if it so
desired, distinguish between different "types" of organized crime?
Although application of the civil cause of action created by 18
U.S.C. § 1964(c) is not yet valid in the context of clergy-related sex-
ual abuse, RICO could theoretically be applied to priests, bishops,
and the Church as defendants in the future. Unless RICO is legis-
latively amended or restricted, an artfully pleaded case based on
clergy sexual abuse could, theoretically, be accepted by a court.
215. 116 CONG. REC. S18,940 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan).
216. 116 CONG. REC. H35,344 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff). See Parker,
supra note 60, at 831-34, for a commentary on the arguments of the American Civil
Liberties Union in response to the OCCA.
217. THE GODFATHER (Paramount Pictures 1972).
218. GOODFELLAS (Warner Bros. Pictures 1990).
219. The Sopranos (HBO Original Series 1999-2002).
220. See, e.g., Mafia: The History of the Mob in America (A & E Entertainment
1993); Biography - John Gotti: A Mafia Story (A & E Entertainment 1987).
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Possible legislative changes could include a more specific definition
of "pattern of racketeering activity," a requirement that a private
civil RICO plaintiff "prove the alleged racketeer acted with a mo-
tive for the imposition of the prior criminal conviction require-
ment," and the imposition of harsher sanctions against lawyers
who file frivolous civil RICO actions.221 Although current case law
suggests that victims of clergy sexual abuse will have a difficult
time sustaining civil RICO claims, continual expansion of RICO's
meaning could allow successful use in upcoming years. As more
and more reports of the sexual abuse committed by priests and al-
legations of subsequent cover-ups implemented by high-level
Church authorities are made public, courts may eventually accept
the cause of action to hold those parties liable for their socially rep-
rehensible acts. Despite this future possibility, application of civil
RICO to clergy-related sexual abuse is at odds with the statute's
own requirements, legislative history, and current case law. But
for how long RICO remains the carefully tailored cause of action it
was intended to be, rather than the discretionary option in a limit-
less number of cases that it is slowly becoming, remains uncertain.
Nicholas R. Mancini
221, Melley, supra note 23, at 312.
Dedication
The Board of Editors of the Roger Williams University Law
Review respectfully dedicates this issue to Justice John P. Bourcier
and Senior Justice Victoria S. Lederberg, both of whom passed
away during the latter part of 2002. The untimely and unexpected
passing of these two outstanding justices of the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court shocked and saddened us all. The Board of Editors
wishes to extend its deepest sympathies and heartfelt condolences
to the families, friends, and colleagues of these truly remarkable
citizens and members of the judiciary.
In honor of Justices Bourcier and Lederberg, this issue in-
cludes memorial dedications to the justices by their colleague and
friend, Chief Justice Frank J. Williams of the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court.
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